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l1N THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Dl!}VERL Y HOWE, 
Plaintijf-Ap pellant, 
vs. 
WALTER J ACKSOX, Doing Business 
as MERCY AMBULANCE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10570 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out 
of a collision between the plaintiff driving a pick-up 
truck and the defendant driving an ambulance on an 
emergency run. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment for the defendant, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent seeks an affirmace of the 
judgment below. 
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OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as appellant's brief generally fails to re-
cite the evidence supporting the verdict, we shall under-
take that task. 
The defendant's white ambulance (R. 12, 112 and de-
fendant's exhibit 4) was on an emergency call from Har-
risville to Ogden (R. 10). Defendant had traveled South 
on a four-lane main higlnvay (R. 29) up to 60 miles per 
hour (R. 7) with red light and siren operating (R. 19, 20, 
21). When the defendant was about two-tenths of a mile 
north of the accident intersection, the semaphore light 
turm·d red for south bound traffic into the intersection 
(R. S, 25). The defendant then started slowing down 
(R. 8) from 50 miles per hour (R. 103) by braking (R. 
15). The speed limit for south bound traffic in the 
vicinity of the accident ·was 50 miles per hour (R. 24). 
The plaintiff was traveling east on 12th Street ap-
proaching the intersection at 20-25 miles per hour (R. 39). 
She was operating a pick-up truck with an annoying cast 
on her right forearm and hand (R. 50, 52, 60). Her two 
teenage daughters ·were seated in the cab of the truck 
(R. 38). The plaintiff's left door window was down 
(R. 53). It was a quiet Sunday morning (R. 53). Plain· 
tiff had a clear view of traffic approaching from the 
north (R. 32, 52, 59 and Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2). 
Plaintiff saw the defendant's ambulance approach from 
the north at what appeared to plaintiff to be a fast speed 
at a point three-fourths of a block north of the intersec· 
tion (R. 39, 54-55). At that time and thereafter the def en· 
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dant's red light and siren were operating and clearly 
detectable (R. 53, 100, 101, 10-! and 106), although the 
plaintiff claims that she never saw the red light or heard 
the siren of the ambulance ( R. -!1). 'l'he semaphore light 
turned green in favor of the plaintiff when she was three-
fourths of a block west of the intersection or just as 
she was entering the intersection (R. 39, 55 and 57). 
The only traffic in the vicinity of the intersection 
was the defendant's south bound vehicle, Martin's west 
bound vehicle, and a Mr. Scivally who was stopped at 
the south boundary of the intersection headed north (R. 
39 and 40). 
As defendant was about to enter the intersection he 
observed Martin's pick-up truck start up from a stopped 
position at the eastern approach to the intersection (R. 
16, 26). Defendant thereupon braked further, turned 
slightly to the right to avoid Martin {R. 16, 26, 118), 
and entered the intersection traveling at less than 20 
miles per hour (R. 11'7). Martin had no obstruction to his 
view of defendant's ambulance (R. 31, Defendant's Ex-
hibits 1 and 2) yet Martin made no attempt to avoid the 
ambulance (R. 111). The front of Martin's truck struck 
the left rear door and fender of the ambulance (R. 16, 33) 
knocking the ambulance out of control to the west (R. 
109) and into the plaintiff's pickup-truck which had en-
tered the intersection from the west (R. 22, 23, 40, 103). 
The plaintiff did not heed or otherwise observe the am-
bulance until after it had been struck by Martin, which 
collision was not observed by the plaintiff (R. 58, 59) · 
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Plaintiffs and defondant's vd1iek•s moved but a short 
distance after im1iact (R. GO, 113). 
The defendant doing lnrniness as 11ercy Ambulance 
Service was authorized to 01wrate ambulances by the 
Township of Harrisville and the of Roy (R. 98, 99, 
138). The defendant held himself out to the public as an 
ambulance servic(o (R. 11) and had subjected his am-
bulance service to the Public Service Commission under 
the provisions of Sedion 5-±-G-1:2, U.1C.A. 1953 as amended 
(R. 134, 135 and Defendant's Exhibit 3). 
ARGU:MENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO DIRECT LIABILITY AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT 
Plaintiff consistently challenged the status of the 
defendant as an "authorized emergency vehicle." 
Throughout the trial plaintiff's JJOsition was premised 
on the notion, now apparently abandoned, that defendant 
could not obtain authorization as an emergency vehicle 
from either Harrisville or Roy but was dependent upon 
authorization from either the Public Safety Department 
of Utah or Ogden City (T. 5, G, 9, 10, 35, 36, 89, 138, 139, 
156). Thus evidence was introduced by defendant with 
respect to authorization from Roy and Harrisville and 
by plaintiff on the absence of authorization from the De-
partment of Public Safety and Ogden. Plaintiff made no 
point of the fact that defendant lacked status as a "muni-
cipal department or public service corporation." There-
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fore no detailed evidence was introduced on such status 
and qualification of the defendant other than the author-
izations by the Public Service Commission, Roy and 
Harrisville and that the defendant held himself out to 
the public through a telephone listing. Although the 
plain ti ff in her requested instruction No. 8 invited the 
trial court to cite the prnvisions of Section 41-6-3, U.C.A. 
1953 as amended, defining an "authorized emergency 
vehicle" at no time did the plaintiff request any amplifi-
cation for the jury as to what constituted municipal de-
partments or public service corporations. Nor did the 
plaintiff seek relief on this issue by motion for a new 
trial. The main burden of plaintiff's present appeal that 
the defendant was not a municipal department or public 
service corporation is thus a novel and belated issue which 
should be ignored. Chmnncy v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 381 
P.2d 84. 
The meaning of the terms "Public Service Corpora-
tion" ref erred to in Section 41-6-3, U.C.A. 1953 as amend-
ed may be found in the total context of Section 54-2-1, 
U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the Public Utilities Act. Therein 
the various public service corporations by definition 
include corpo·rations and individuals. 
As this court indicated in the recent case of Blom-
qitist & Granite Credit vs. Zion's First National Ba.nk, 
______ Utah 2d ______ , ______ P.2d ------, statutes "must be looked at 
carefully in cognizance of the full meaning underlying 
both the terms used and the purpose sought to be ac-
complished." Thus comts have construed the wo·rd "cor-
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poration" in statutes to indude natural persons whenever 
it has aplJL'ared that the legislative intent required it. 18 
Arn. Jnr. 2d, Corporations, :SL'C. 3, page 550. 
In Bischcll L State, 157 P.2d -11, (Cal.), under a Cali-
fornia statute defining an (•11wrgency vehicle as one op-
erated by state or county "fin' 1Yarden" or "forest ranger" 
a salaried employee of the Forestry Department as-
signed to dut.\' b.\' an authorized fire warden or forest 
ranger was, in the broader sem;e of the statutory lan-
guage, deemed "a fire warden." 
There is no apparent reason to construe the term 
"public service corporation" strictly and literally, as 
plaintiff contPnds, so as to discriminate in favor of cor-
porations over individuals in receiving the special status 
of an authorized emergency vehicle. Such a construction 
suhjects the statute to an unintended, unreasonable and 
unnecessary challengL· of arbitrary discrimination which 
would be constitutionall.\· objectionable. Under common 
principles of construction, t->tatutes should be construed 
m favor of their validity. 
That the defendant conws within the ambit of pub-
lic service and a public carrier is evident from the pro-
nouncement of this court in State vs. N clson, 65 Utah 
457, 238 P. 237: 
" (A) common or public carrier is one 
who, by virtue of his business or calling or hold-
ing out, undertakes for eompensation to transport 
perso,ns or property, or both, from one place to 
anothn for all such as may ehoose to employ him. 
Running through the cases is a recognition of the 
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element of public service, serving and 
carrymg all persons indifferently who apply for 
passage or for shipment of goods or freight ... 
Public service, as distinguished from mere pri-
vate service, is thus necessarily a factor to con-
stitute a common carrier. Such element, in por-
tions of the act, is not as clearly expressed as 
might be. Nevertheless, it necessarily is implied." 
Such principles are embodied in SPctlon :'51-G-1. F. 
C.A. 1953 as amended, which provides: 
"'Common motor carrier of passengers' means 
any person who holds himself out to the public 
as willing to undertake for hire to transport by 
motor vehicle from place to place, persons who 
may choose to employ him." 
Enchancing the defendant's status as a "public ser-
vice corporation" and "authorized emergency vehicle" 
is the defendant's authorization to operate an ambulance 
as an exempt carrier under the provisions of Section 
54-6-12, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, under which defendant 
subjected himself to certain controls and regulations of 
the Public Service Commission. 
There is also authority for the proposition that even 
without express statutory exemption, vehicles engaged 
in emergency governmental service are exempt from the 
usual traffic regulations. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles & 
Highway Traffic, Sec. 172 at page 727. 
Dallas Railway and Terminal Co. vs. Walsh, 
156 SW2d 320 (Tex.) is an intermediate appellate court 
opinion which, in addition to the holding therein cited 
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by plaintiff':-: ln·i(•f, pr<·rnised its dP(·ision upon the fol-
Jmving: 
"Furtlt\•r, ev<'n if said arnlmlaiH'P was an 
authorizPd n·hielP by the single test 
that it did lwlung to a pnhli(' :st>rviee corporation 
tlwre \nls 11 <'V<' rtlw l<•s:s no evidence sufficif•nt to 
slim\· that it had lwen 'd<·:signated' or 'authorized' 
as sud1 Ji:-· tlw Chief of Poliee." 
Lay us. f cllo1r Ca/1 Ta.11, 73 Atl. 2d ±21 (Del.), 
cited in plaintiff's lJriL•f, is a trial eourt opinion. 
Jn Roqers cs. City of Lus A11gelcs, ±-1 P.2d 465, 
1 Cal. i. tli•· follo\\ ing iwrti1wnt language ::;lwuld also be 
not<>d: 
" ( 11l('s:-; ::;he· km•\\' or in th<' exercise of ordin-
ary slwuld have known that thP ambulance 
\YaS approaching, the plaintiff driving the coupe 
was under no obligation to anticipate its presence." 
Plaintiff's belated suggestion that the defendant does 
not qualify a:::; a urnni(!ipal er public service 
l'O<l'poration should lw ignored in this appeal. In any 
event tlw c·viden('e in the court established that the 
defondant was an autl10riz(•d emergency vehicle as a mat-
ter of lm\· or upon the findings implicit in the verdict. 
Not only docs the evidenc\! fail to establish any negli-
gence of the defendant as a matter of law, but it does, 
\1-e submit, establish as a matter of law that the plain-
tiff \ms contrihntoril_\- negligent in failing to give heed 
to the defendant's amlinlancp \\·hi('h she saw three-fourths 
of a block mrny from the intPnwdion traveling at a fast 
speed which, in tlH• Pxercise of ordinary care, she should 
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have known was an emergency vehicle with red light and 
siren employed. Jensen vs. Taylor 2 Utah 2d 196 271 
' ' 
P.2d 838; Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 
::-184; Martin vs. Ehlers, 13 Utah 2d 236, 371P.2d851. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION No. 2. 
Although the lower court did express an intention of 
ruling as a matter of law that the defendant was an 
"authorized emergency vehicle," as heretofore indicated 
in our argument under Point 1, such ruling was not 
made and the court did in fact permit the parties to in-
troduce evidence with respect to authorization and lack 
of it by the Department of Public Safety and local 
authorities and did submit such issue to the jury. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION No. 4. 
The courts instructions No. 11 and No. 9 fairly ap-
prised the jury that if they found that the defendant was 
not an authorized emergency vehicle then he would not 
be entitled to proceed past a red signal, which rule of 
law is well known to all persons who can qualify as jurors. 
POINT 4 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION No. 8. 
Inasmuch as counsel stipulated that "local authority" 
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had authorized thr> dt>fenclant as an ambulance, the al-
leged failure to dPsignatP the' Department of Public 
Safety in the instruction could not have affected the ver-
dict. The plaintiff's exception to the court's instruction 
No. 8 was based on the premise that "the authorization 
must be by the DPvartrnent of Public Safety or by local 
authorities" (R. 156) without reference to defendant's 
status as a municipal department or public service cor-
poration. 
POINT 5 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION No. 8. 
In view of the stipulation of plaintiff that defendant 
was authorized as an ambulance by local authorities, and 
the failure o.f plaintiff to make any point in the lower 
court of the status of the defendant as a municipal de-
partment or public service corporation or to request 
amplifying instructions thereon for the jury, we submit 
that the court did not err in refusing plaintiff's instruc-
tion No. 8. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's vehicle was an "authorized emer-
gency vehicle" as a matter of law. Plaintiff's failure to 
raise any issue in the lower court on the defendant's 
status as a "public service corporation" should bar plain· 
tiff's present appeal thereon. As a matter of law the de· 
fondant ,,-as not 1wgligcnt but the plaintiff was contrib· 
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utorily negligent. The case was fairly submitted to the 
jury whose verdict that the defendant was not proxi-
mately negligent and/or that the plaintiff was contrib-
utorily negligent should be affirmed. 
Respectfully .rnbmitted, 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
By JAY E. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
1205 Continental Bank Bldg 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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